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PROTECTING UNPROTECTED DATA IN MHEALTH 
Jonathan Deitch* 
 
ABSTRACT— Health-focused smartphone applications and internet of 
things (IoT) devices such as wearable fitness trackers (together, “mHealth”), 
offer a chance to monitor and manage health during the time spent away from 
a doctor. Unfortunately for consumers, much of personal health data 
generated by these devices and applications is critically unprotected by 
existing privacy laws in the United States. Due to the inadequacy of the 
current regulatory framework, there remain five crucial gaps of oversight and 
protection which plague many of these health-focused apps and devices: (A) 
Difference in Individuals’ Access Rights; (B) Difference in Re-Use of Data 
by Third Parties; (C) Difference in Security Standards Applicable to Data 
Holders and Users; (D) Differences in Understanding of Terminology About 
Privacy and Security Protections; and (E) Inadequate Collection, Use, and 
Disclosure Limitations. This Note explores these oversight gaps and 
analyzes whether proposed and emerging solutions can meet this 
fundamental regulatory need. These solutions range from sweeping industry-
agnostic privacy legislation to proposals targeted to this specific problem in 
mHealth. Overall, this Note will weigh the costs and benefits of these options 
as they are currently understood. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As recently as 2016, Americans visited with their primary care 
physicians roughly 1.5 times per year on a per capita basis.1 However, in 
2020 the COVID-19 pandemic has at least temporarily altered the provision 
of healthcare in the United States, rapidly taking a sizeable subset of primary 
care visits from in-person to online.2 While regular in-person clinician visits 
are an essential feature of a sound healthcare regimen, under normal 
circumstances clinical care accounts for only fifteen percent of overall health 
outcomes while social and behavioral determinants account for sixty 
percent.3 For the health conscious, focusing on these social and behavioral 
determinants will likely become even more important as the current public 
health crisis alters the circumstances and manner in which we interact with 
health professionals. Especially in 2020, health-focused smartphone 
applications and internet of things devices (IoT), such as wearable fitness 
trackers (together, “mHealth”), offer a chance to monitor and manage health 
during the time spent away from a doctor, and show exciting promise for 
COVID-19 surveillance as well.4 These applications and devices already 
collect substantial quantities of consumer health information and will gather 
exponentially more as their adoption increases and new use-cases are 
realized.5 In fact, a recent study notes that the average patient will produce 
2,750 times more data related to behavior and lifestyle compared to the data 
collected from their clinical encounters, with an estimated 1,100 terabytes of 
 
 1 Pinyao Rui & Titilayo Okeyode, National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 2016 Summary 
Tables (2016), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/ahcd/namcs_summary/2016_namcs_web_tables.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S42Q-X5F2] (indicating that in 2016 Americans visited their primary care physicians 
151.6 times per 100 persons per year). 
 2 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., MEDICARE BENEFICIARY USE OF TELEHEALTH 
VISITS: EARLY DATA FROM THE START OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 1 (2020) (stating that 43.5% of 
Medicare primary care visits in April 2020 were provided via telehealth, compared with 0.1% in February 
2020). 
 3 Shubham Singhal & Stephanie Carlton, The Era of Exponential Improvement in Healthcare?, 
MCKINSEY & CO. (May 2019), https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services
/our-insights/the-era-of-exponential-improvement-in-healthcare [https://perma.cc/5F7J-ADRN]. 
 4 Id.; see TEJASWINI MISHRA ET AL., EARLY DETECTION OF COVID-19 USING A SMARTWATCH 2 
(2020) (“COVID-19 infections are associated with alterations in heart rate, steps and sleep in 80% of 
COVID-19 infection cases.”). 
 5 Singhal & Carlton, supra note 3. 
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data produced over the individual’s lifetime.6 The threshold concern this 
Note will build on is: with greater sums of consumer health data comes 
greater potential for abuse, especially when this information falls outside of 
the purview of existing privacy laws.7 
Perhaps the most famous of these existing privacy laws affecting health 
data is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
However, HIPAA’s protections are aimed at data sent, received, or 
maintained by “covered entities” (CEs): health plans, health care 
clearinghouses, and healthcare providers transmitting health information 
electronically. HIPAA also applies to “business associates” (BAs): those 
who receive, maintain, or transmit protected health information (“PHI”) on 
behalf of a covered entity.8 A considerable subset of health applications, 
devices, and services available today fit into neither of the listed categories 
and are therefore outside of HIPAA’s protections; these are called non-
covered entities (NCEs).9 NCEs inhabit a regulatory grey area, potentially 
leaving these new repositories of personal health information critically 
unprotected. 
In addition to evaluating the sufficiency of current regulatory 
frameworks, this Note will explore the challenges in classifying data’s 
“sensitivity,” while concluding with analysis of whether proposed and 
emerging solutions can meet this fundamental regulatory need. These 
solutions range from sweeping industry-agnostic privacy legislation to 
proposals targeted to this specific problem in healthcare. Overall, this Note 
will weigh the costs and benefits of these options as they are currently 
understood. 
I. SUMMARY OF CURRENT HEALTHCARE PRIVACY REGULATION 
A. HIPAA 
Seeking to address issues of healthcare fraud, administrative 
simplification, and the computerization of health information, Congress 
 
 6 Id. 
 7 See discussion infra Section II.B and generally Section II for examples of abusive data practices. 
Particularly troubling is the ability to re-identify individuals across anonymous datasets and, 
subsequently, the ability to make potentially lucrative inferences about an individual’s health from even 
non-health data. 
 8 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(3) (2019). 
 9 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY & SECURITY OF 
HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY HIPAA 1 (2016) [hereinafter HHS, 
EXAMINING OVERSIGHT], https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/non-covered_entities_report_june
_17_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JZU-DQJF]. 
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enacted HIPAA in 1996.10 Under Title II of the Act, Congress empowered 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights 
(OCR) to promulgate rules to protect the privacy of health information, the 
sum of which is commonly known as the Privacy Rule.11 The Privacy Rule 
“create[d] for the first time, a floor of national protections” for personal 
health information.12 Mindful of advances in health information systems, 
with the Privacy Rule and later the Health Information Technology 
Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009, OCR drives 
compliance principles applicable to electronic transactions of health 
information executed by CEs or on their behalf by BAs.13 Data qualifying for 
protection under HIPAA is PHI, defined as information that “relates to the 
past, present, or future physical or mental health condition of an 
individual . . . [and] the provision of health care to an individual.”14 The 
Privacy Rule mandates collection or eventual use of PHI to the “minimum 
necessary” extent and features other obligations common in the emerging 
canon of privacy laws relating to access, notice, and consent while requiring 
authorization to use or disclose protected information.15 
Title II of the Act is also home to the Security Rule, which requires CEs 
and BAs to undertake a risk assessment to “identify and mitigate risks to the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the electronic protected health 
information (ePHI) they create, receive, maintain, or transmit.”16 The 
Security Rule also sets forth administrative, physical, and technical 
safeguards of PHI in the care of CEs and BAs.17 These safeguards are geared 
towards the management of: identity and access, security, risk, incident 
response, and IT best practices.18 Standards are accompanied by 
implementation specifications that are either “addressable” or “required,” 
allowing organizations flexibility to choose security measures based on an 
assessment of the “size, complexity, and capabilities” of the enterprise.19 For 
 
 10 See Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations Promulgated 
Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. FED. 133 (2004). 
 11 Id.; 42 §§ U.S.C. 1302(a), 1320d-9; see 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164. 
 12 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 
14, 2002) (codified at C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
 13 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 17921; 42 U.S.C. §§ 17934–40; 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. 
 14 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. HIPAA protects only individually identifiable health information and not de-
identified data. 
 15 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d); see discussion infra Section IV.A. 
 16 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 16. 
 17 45 C.F.R. § 164.302. 
 18 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 16. 
 19 45 C.F.R. § 164.306. 
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example, among the technical safeguards in section 164.312, the 
implementation specification of “encryption” of information at rest and in 
transit is listed as addressable, permitting a given organization to decide if 
implementing the safeguard is “reasonable and appropriate . . . in its 
environment, when analyzed with reference to the likely contribution to 
protecting health information.”20 Continuing with the same example, if the 
organization decides encryption is not reasonable and appropriate, the 
rationale for this must be documented and an equivalent alternative must be 
implemented—if reasonable and appropriate.21 Ultimately, “the Security 
Rule is designed to be flexible and scalable so a covered entity can 
implement policies, procedures, and technologies that are appropriate for the 
entity’s particular size, organizational structure, and risks to consumers’ e-
PHI.”22 
HIPAA also features breach notification and enforcement rules.23 The 
Breach Notification Rule mandates that CEs and BAs provide notification 
after a breach of unsecured PHI, defining a breach as an impermissible 
“acquisition, access, use, or disclosure of protected health information” in a 
manner not permitted under the Privacy Rule.24 Such events are “presumed 
to be a breach” barring a CE or BA’s demonstration of low probability that 
PHI was compromised.25 Exceptions to the definition of breach include 
unintentional or inadvertent acquisition, access, or use of PHI by employees 
or persons acting under authority of CEs and BAs.26 After a breach, CEs must 
notify affected individuals, the Secretary of HHS, and prominent media 
outlets—if the event impacts more than 500 residents of the given state or 
jurisdiction.27 HIPAA’s Enforcement Rule allows for the imposition of civil 
and criminal penalties for violations. Civil penalties may reach an annual 
maximum of $1,500,000 in certain circumstances, and criminal penalties 
may include both hefty fines and imprisonment.28 
 
 20 Id.; 45 C.F.R. § 164.312. 
 21 45 C.F.R. § 164.312. 
 22 Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov
/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regulations/index.html [https://perma.cc/4FNY-9LZJ]. 
 23 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.400–414 (Breach Notification Rule); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.300–312 (Enforcement 
Rule). 
 24 45 C.F.R. § 164.402; Breach Notification Rule, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/breach-notification/index.html [https://perma.cc/SK32-
38UZ]. 
 25 Breach Notification Rule, supra note 24. 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See HIPAA Violations & Enforcement, AM. MED. ASS’N (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.ama-assn
.org/practice-management/hipaa/hipaa-violations-enforcement [https://perma.cc/RC9E-ZS68]. 
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B. FTC 
The Federal Trade Commission’s jurisdiction stems from section 5 of 
the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), which empowers the agency 
to regulate “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”29 The FTC Act defines an 
unfair act or practice as one that “causes or is likely to cause substantial 
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers 
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or 
to competition.”30 While no specific definition of a deceptive trade practice 
exists in the Act, a 1983 policy statement notes that “[t]he Commission will 
find an act or practice deceptive if there is a misrepresentation, omission, or 
other practice, that misleads the consumer acting reasonably in the 
circumstances, to the consumer’s detriment.”31 For example, an inaccurate or 
misleading statement in a privacy policy could be a deceptive practice, while 
inadequate security protections causing or likely to cause customer injury 
might be an unfair practice under contemporary interpretations of the Act.32 
As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 
Congress directed the FTC to promulgate rules addressing breaches of health 
data in the care of certain entities not covered by HIPAA.33 The result was 
 
 29 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
 30 Id.; see also Fed. Trade Comm’n, Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer 
Unfairness Jurisdiction, appended to Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–76 (1984) (providing 
extra details to three unfairness considerations: (1) whether the practice injures consumers; (2) whether it 
violates established public policy; and (3) whether it is unethical or unscrupulous). 
 31 Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement of Policy on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. 
110, 174–84 (1984). 
 32 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 17–18. As an example of a deceptive trade practice 
in the digital health context, the report cites PaymentsMD, LLC, No. C-4505 (F.T.C. Jan. 27, 2015) 
(decision and order), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150206paymentsmddo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RHU2-KEYV] (alleging company deceived customers who signed up for online billing 
function by failing to inform them that the company would collect “highly detailed” medical information 
about them). And, as an example of an unfair trade practice related to inadequate security, the report cites 
Accretive Health, Inc., No. C-4432 (F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2014) (decision and order), https://www.ftc.gov
/system/files/documents/cases/140224accretivehealthdo.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST7P-2WGT] (alleging 
that medical billing and revenue management services risked consumers’ personal and health 
information, by transporting laptops with sensitive data in a way that made them vulnerable to theft and 
giving access to personal information to employees who did not need it to do their jobs among other 
things). 
 33 42 U.S.C. § 17937; 16 C.F.R. § 318.1 (2020). The FTC Rule applies specifically to personal health 
records (“PHRs”) or PHR-related entities. A PHR is defined as “an electronic record of . . . identifiable 
health information on an individual that can be drawn from multiple sources and that is managed, shared, 
and controlled by or primarily for the individual.” 16 C.F.R. § 318.2. A variety of mHealth applications, 
wearables, and other digital health products might fit within the definitions of PHR, PHR-related vendor, 
and third-party service provider. See also Reece Hirsch & Jenny Harrison, Digital Health Privacy: Old 
Laws Meet New Technologies, 27 J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. CALIF. LAWS. ASS’N 21, 28 
(2018), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/publication/outside-publication/article/2018/cal-
bar-digital-health-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BQ6-6W4J] (“A PHR-related entity is an entity that 
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the FTC Health Breach Notification Rule. Parallel to its HIPAA counterpart, 
the FTC Rule requires regulated entities to notify affected individuals, the 
agency, and the media (in certain situations) following a breach of 
unsecured, individually identifiable health information.34 Finally, the 
Commission treats a violation of the FTC Rule as an unfair or deceptive trade 
practice.35 
C. FDA 
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) impact on digital health is 
through its regulation of medical devices, enabled by the United States 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).36 The FDCA defines a 
device as: 
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant . . . 
including any component, part, or accessory, which is . . . intended for use in 
the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, 
or prevention of disease . . . or intended to affect the structure or function of the 
body.37 
Should a particular mHealth solution qualify as a device in the eyes of 
the agency,38 the degree of regulatory oversight for the device varies based 
on how it is classified.39 Each classification has a different set of 
requirements ranging from extensive pre- and post-market checks to a host 
 
interacts with a PHR vendor by either offering products or services through the vendor’s website or by 
accessing information in a PHR or sending information to a PHR.”). 
 34 16 C.F.R. § 318.5; HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 19. Third-party service 
providers are obligated to notify their vendor or PHR-related entity. Like HIPAA, cut-off for media notice 
requirement is a breach affecting 500 or more individuals. 
 35 16 C.F.R. § 318.7. 
 36 21 U.S.C. § 393. 
 37 21 U.S.C. § 321 (emphasis added). 
 38 But see, e.g., U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GENERAL WELLNESS: POLICY FOR LOW RISK DEVICES: 
GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF (Sept. 27, 2019) [hereinafter 
FDA, LOW RISK DEVICES] (indicating that the FDA chooses to not regulate all “devices”). 
 39 See Classify Your Medical Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-
devices/overview-device-regulation/classify-your-medical-device [https://perma.cc/H47E-G6H9] 
(noting three classes of device: I, II, and III, each with greater oversight; classification is based on patient 
risk profile, intended use of device, and indications for use). But see Device Software Functions Including 
Mobile Medical Applications, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/digital-
health/device-software-functions-including-mobile-medical-applications, [https://perma.cc/6THA-
NCTZ] (indicating that software functions that meet the regulatory definition of a device but pose minimal 
risk to patients and consumers will not require premarket review applications or registration of software 
with FDA). 
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of milder obligations.40 For example, the FDA recommends that, for devices 
requiring pre-market submissions, manufacturers provide cybersecurity-
related supporting documentation including: identification of assets, threats, 
and vulnerability; assessment of potential impacts on device functionality; 
assessment of likelihood of vulnerabilities being exploited; determination of 
mitigation strategies; and more. To further these objectives, the Agency 
recognizes certain industry standards for dealing with information 
technology and medical device security.41 However, regardless of 
classification and unless excepted, the manufacturers of networked medical 
devices should have a “Quality System” in place, which includes procedures 
for identifying potential safety concerns, among them cybersecurity.42 While 
the FDA has wielded its regulatory authority over a variety of mHealth 
contexts, including physical devices and mobile medical applications, recent 
guidance from the Agency makes clear that it will regulate only software that 
operates as a medical device whose potential failure risks patient safety.43 
Further, the Agency has indicated that it will not regulate general wellness 
products, defined as those intended for “general wellness use,” that pose low 
risk to the safety of their users.44 For these products, the FDA will not attempt 
to determine whether they fit the definition of a device nor will the Agency 
assess whether these products require pre-market registration, review, or 
post-market obligations.45 
 
 40 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., POLICY FOR DEVICE SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS AND MOBILE 
MEDICAL APPLICATIONS: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF 
(2019) [hereinafter FDA, SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS]. 
 41 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., CONTENT OF PREMARKET SUBMISSIONS FOR MANAGEMENT OF 
CYBERSECURITY IN MEDICAL DEVICES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF (2014) [hereinafter FDA, PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY]. 
 42 21 C.F.R. § 820.30(g) (2020) (“Design validation shall include software validation and risk 
analysis, where appropriate.”); FDA, PREMARKET CYBERSECURITY, supra note 41 (noting that 
§ 802.30(g) applies to cybersecurity). 
 43 See, e.g., Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Director, Office of In Vitro Diagnostics and Radiological 
Health, FDA, to Ann Wojcicki, CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013),  https://wayback.archive-it.org
/7993/20180908082647/https://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/WarningLetters
/2013/ucm376296.htm [https://perma.cc/MF8M-U9PC] (warning that 23andMe’s interactive, home 
DNA testing kit service qualifies as a medical device under FDCA’s definition; 23andme is considered a 
Class III device); FDA, SOFTWARE FUNCTIONS, supra note 40, at 9 (noting that regulatory oversight will 
be aimed at (1) software which is used as an accessory to a regulated medical device or (2) transforms a 
mobile platform into a regulated medical device). 
 44 FDA, LOW RISK DEVICES, supra note 38, at 3, 5 (defining general wellness products as those that 
have an intended use of encouraging a general state of health or a healthy activity, or an intended use that 
relates the role of a healthy lifestyle with helping to reduce the risk of impact of certain chronic diseases 
or conditions; defining risk based on whether product is invasive, implanted, or involves 
intervention/technology that may pose safety risk to users absent regulation).  
 45 Id. 
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II. INSUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
In 2016, HHS released a report to Congress detailing the security and 
privacy concerns of health data existing outside the protections of HIPAA 
and other laws impacting health data privacy.46 In particular, the report 
focused on mHealth technologies: personal health records, mobile apps, and 
wearable fitness trackers that collect health information from consumers and 
facilitate its sharing.47 Given that these technologies are not typically 
“offered or provided to the individual” by CEs or BAs, they are outside the 
scope of HIPAA and are classified as NCEs by HHS.48 According to the HHS 
report, NCEs face five major gaps of oversight and protection when 
compared to entities and associates subject to HIPAA’s existing frameworks: 
“(A) Difference in Individuals’ Access Rights; (B) Difference in Re-Use of 
Data by Third Parties; (C) Difference in Security Standards Applicable to 
Data Holders and Users; (D) Differences in Understanding of Terminology 
About Privacy and Security Protections; [and] (E) Inadequate Collection, 
Use, and Disclosure Limitations.”49 
A. Difference in Individuals’ Access Rights 
NCEs are under no legal obligation to provide customers access to their 
own data. While NCEs might voluntarily extend access rights to users, they 
are not required to do so. The HHS report frames the discrepancies in access 
rights with NCEs as an issue of transparency because taking advantage of 
access rights aids a consumer in understanding “policies, procedures, and 
technologies that directly affect . . . their individually identifiable health 
information.”50 
B. Difference in Re-Use of Data by Third Parties 
In addition to lacking access rights, consumers with data held by NCEs 
face differences in re-use and sharing standards with third parties. While 
HIPAA rules restrict both the types of recipients and the purposes for 
information disclosure, data provided to NCEs lacks similar protections 
unless the data collector has represented otherwise in the terms of service.51 
 
 46 See generally HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 1. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 4. 
 49 Id. at 20. 
 50 Id. at 21 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR 
FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., NATIONWIDE PRIVACY AND SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC 
EXCHANGE OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION 7 (Dec. 15, 2008), 
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nationwide-ps-framework-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZKZ-
4ERQ]). 
 51 See supra Section I.B. 
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As a result, NCEs may have more latitude to disclose health information for 
marketing purposes. In fact, a recent study of some of the top-rated Android 
mHealth applications available in the United Kingdom, the United States, 
Canada, and Australia describes an expansive and complex network of third 
and fourth parties with whom health data is shared.52 Notably, nineteen of 
twenty-four sampled applications (79%) shared user information to a 
universe of fifty-five unique entities, which received and processed the 
data.53 Of these fifty-five entities, thirty-seven (67%) “provided services 
related to the collection and analysis of user data, including analytics or 
advertising, suggesting heightened privacy risks.”54 Further, “[t]hird parties 
advertised the ability to share user data with 216 ‘fourth parties,’” the most 
powerful and common of which are multinational technology companies 
such as Alphabet (Google), Facebook, and Oracle.55 Given their stature and 
reach, these firms collect the largest and most diverse quantities and types of 
data, respectively—enough to permit re-identification of an individual upon 
aggregation.56 
Aggregation of health information at the fourth-party level presents a 
significant privacy concern according to the study. Accordingly, the authors 
advise “taking a systems view of the mobile ecosystem,” mindful of the 
“network positions” of several companies who control parts of app 
development, analytics, and advertising infrastructure.57 When these 
companies couple health information with a “semi-persistent” identifier such 
as an Android ID, they can quickly identify a user and aggregate their 
activities across the app ecosystem.58 The study notes that a fourth party, 
especially one with monopoly position within the mobile ecosystem, could 
easily compile disparate application data into a rudimentary health profile 
for an individual. The application data could be any combination of current 
medications, active problems, past medical history, and more depending on 
the data sources.59 Worse yet, another potential scenario involves insurance 
 
 52 Quinn Grundy et al., Data Sharing Practices of Medicines Related Apps and the Mobile 
Ecosystem: Traffic, Content, and Network Analysis, BRIT. MED. J., March 20, 2019, at 1, 1. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 1, 7. 
 56 Id. at 8. Fourth parties are defined as those entities which are two steps removed from the mHealth 
company with whom information is shared. 
 57 Id. at 10. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id.; cf. Complaint at 24, Smith v. Facebook, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 943 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 5:16-
cv-01282), 2016 WL 1042966 (alleging defendants combined third party tracking data, search requests, 
and “like” activity to create basic health profiles which it could sell for health-related advertising 
purposes). 
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companies obtaining these data aggregates to reveal an individual’s medical 
condition to inform a premium increase or a denial of coverage.60 
C. Differences in Security Standards 
Applicable to Data Holders and Users 
NCEs might also lack the administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards that HIPAA’s Security Rule either recommends or requires.61 
Further, the combination of NCEs being outside of HIPAA jurisdiction, the 
lack of FTC-mandated security standards, and the FDA’s choice to not 
regulate low-risk devices means that NCE platforms might not be protected 
by any formalized security protocols.62 Often missing are adequate identity-
verification modalities, including password complexity and multi-factor 
authentication requirements, as well as risk- or audit-assessment 
capabilities.63 And, even if NCEs were subject to HIPAA’s protections, many 
of the safeguards that the Security Rule supplies offer little comfort due to 
their often optional nature and lack of granularity.64 Returning to a previous 
example, this means that CEs and BAs implementing the addressable 
standard of “encryption” are not required to deploy any particular industry 
standard for encryption.65 This was no accident; not only was the Security 
Rule designed to be flexible and scalable, its framers also had an eye toward 
“technological neutrality” in order to accommodate emerging standards and 
innovation.66 Nevertheless, sufficient encryption practices are otherwise 
prudent for NCEs given the negative incentive of the FTC Breach 
Notification Rule and its associated enforcement consequences.67 
 
 60 Kevin Loria, Are Health Apps Putting Your Privacy at Risk?, CONSUMER REP. (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/are-health-apps-putting-your-privacy-at-risk/ 
[https://perma.cc/ZG56-EWBS]. 
 61 See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 62 See supra text accompanying notes 16–22; see also discussion supra Sections I.B–C. 
 63 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 23–24. 
 64 Tim Wafa, How the Lack of Prescriptive Technical Granularity in HIPAA Has Compromised 
Patient Privacy, 30 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 531, 542 (2010). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 543 (citing 68 Fed. Reg. 8334–36 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, 164)). 
 67 See supra text accompanying notes 33–35; see also U.S. FED. TRADE COMM’N, CAREFUL 
CONNECTIONS: BUILDING SECURITY IN THE INTERNET OF THINGS (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/plain-language/pdf0199-carefulconnections-buildingsecurityinternetofthings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P33S-ATRP] (suggesting best-practices to secure internet of things devices). 
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D. Differences in Understanding of Terminology 
About Privacy and Security Protections 
According to the HHS report, NCEs are fraught with inconsistencies in 
terms of privacy policy content, if not lacking privacy policies altogether.68 
At present there are no federal requirements for NCEs to have privacy 
policies or notices informing consumers about data-use practices that may 
impact their health information.69 In addition, definitions of key terms like 
“health information,” “individually identifiable health information,” and 
“protected health information” are often inconsistent across NCE platforms 
despite having fixed meanings within various privacy laws.70 For example, 
“protected health information” under HIPAA is defined based on both its 
content and its association with CEs and BAs, whereas “health information” 
also has a lay meaning to consumers that is likely different than HIPAA’s.71 
Even if a privacy policy does exist for an NCE, it may be modified without 
notice to the consumer.72 In addition, the actual content of privacy policies 
may be difficult for lay consumers to understand.73 In one sampling of 
mHealth apps, the average grade-level readability was 13.78 for privacy 
policies and 15.24 for terms of service.74 This risks “overwhelm[ing] the 
reader with detail . . . and exceptions within exceptions,” making it hard for 
lay consumers to determine important data-use practices, including whether 
any sharing of their health information with third parties takes place.75 
Ultimately, the relative dearth of privacy policies and inconsistencies 
with their content betray a lack of transparency within the ecosystem of 
NCEs.76 
E. Inadequate Collection, Use, and Disclosure Limitations 
The final thematic issue identified in the HHS report is that NCEs are 
not forthrightly limiting their collection, use, or disclosure of consumer 
health data.77 HIPAA’s Privacy Rule mandates collection or eventual use of 
 
 68 Julie M. Robillard et al., Availability, Readability, and Content of Privacy Policies and Terms of 
Agreements of Mental Health Apps, 17 INTERNET INTERVENTIONS 1, 2 (2019) (noting that of 369 unique 
mental health apps only 18% of iOS and 4% of Android apps had privacy policies, and 15% and 3% had 
terms of agreement, respectively). 
 69 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 25. 
 70 Id. at 28. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Robillard et al., supra note 68, at 5. 
 74 Id. at 2. 
 75 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 26–27. 
 76 Id.; Robillard et al., supra note 68, at 1. 
 77 Robillard et al., supra note 68, at 1. 
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PHI to the “minimum necessary” extent with additional limitations on its 
disclosure to other parties.78 NCEs are not bound by such limitations, 
potentially leaving consumers in the dark about how their health data is being 
used. NCEs and their associated third and fourth parties engage in marketing, 
advertising, and behavioral tracking indicating “information use that is likely 
broader than what individuals would anticipate,” leading individuals to 
unwittingly supply sensitive data to these other parties.79 
III. DIFFICULTIES IN CLASSIFYING AND 
DEFINING SENSITIVE INFORMATION 
Privacy laws in the United States are a patchwork of overlapping sector-
specific and sector-agnostic frameworks, which typically “rely on 
determinations about the nature, type, or category of information to assess 
its sensitivity and riskiness.”80 Regulating data in this manner also reflects 
the public’s perceptions of sensitivity across various industries and 
ultimately, categories of information.81 In the case of HIPAA and its various 
subparts, Congress signaled that PHI in the care of CEs and BAs deserved 
special protections.82 However, with the rapid emergence of NCEs and their 
control of vast amounts of health data, new solutions are needed. Assigning 
the same sensitivity level to all health data risks “potentially dangerous 
oversimplification.”83 Thus, expanding the reach of a legacy privacy law like 
HIPAA risks conferring inadequate protections as HIPAA is much less likely 
to provide protections commensurate with advances in data science such as 
technologists’ ability to “take information that appears on its face to be non-
identifiable and turn it into identifiable data.”84 This is due in part to pitfalls 
of the “nature, type, or category” approach rather than one that is geared 
 
 78 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b); 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(d). 
 79 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 29–30. 
 80 Müge Fazlioglu, Beyond the “Nature” of Data: Obstacles to Protecting Sensitive Information in 
the European Union and the United States, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 271, 286 (2019) (emphasis in 
original). 
 81 Id. at 300 (citing David L. Mothersbaugh et al., Disclosure Antecedents in an Online Service 
Context: The Role of Sensitivity of Information, 15 J. SERV. RES. 76, 90–91 (2012)). 
 82 See discussion supra Section I.A. 
 83 Fazlioglu, supra note 80, at 300 (“For instance, the term health data may refer to a diagnosis of a 
common illness, such as a cold or the flu, as well as to a serious disease associated with stigmatization.”); 
see supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 84 Fazlioglu, supra note 80, at 297; Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy 
and A New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011); see 
also supra, note 59 and accompanying text. 
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towards the context of data use—mindful of distinctions between harmful 
and beneficial use-cases.85 Such an approach: 
considers how the context in which information is used affects its level 
of sensitivity. This perspective shifts the focus away from the category of data, 
avoiding the question of what categories are or are not sensitive, to the manner 
of data use and its eventual consequences.86 
In 2010, Professors Paul Schwartz and Daniel Solove of UC Berkeley 
and George Washington School of Law, respectively, proposed a context-
based model premised on a reimagining of the paradigm of “personally 
identifiable information” (PII)—common in most data privacy laws.87 
Mindful of how the risks and benefits of data practices may differ 
situationally, the authors suggest a “PII 2.0” that 
places information on a continuum that begins with no risk of identification at 
one end, and ends with identified individuals at the other . . . [divided into] three 
categories, each with its own regulatory regime . . . information can be about an 
(1) identified, (2) identifiable, or (3) non-identifiable person.88 
Under PII 2.0, where a given data practice falls on the spectrum is a 
context-sensitive determination.89 On a sliding scale of sorts, the scholars 
 
 85 See Fazlioglu, supra note 80, at 286, 288, 291–92 (citing Michal Kosinki et al., Private Traits and 
Attributes Are Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5802, 
5802 (2013)). Fazlioglu notes that through  
“a mechanism used by Facebook users to express their positive association with . . . online 
content,” researchers developed a predictive model that managed to discover sensitive 
information about users, including their sexual orientation, ethnicity, and religious and political 
beliefs . . . mak[ing] “guesses” about a person’s sensitive data with a high degree of accuracy, 
between 85% and 95%. 
Id. See also supra note 59 and accompanying text; Curt Woodward & Hiawatha Bray, A Company Sent 
Anti-Abortion Ads by Phone. Massachusetts Wasn’t Having It, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 4, 2017), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/04/04/healey-halts-digital-ads-targeted-women-
reproductive-clinics/AoyPUG8u9hq9bJUAKC5gZN/story.html [https://perma.cc/PAJ8-J7MD] 
(describing a circumstance where an advertising company used “geofencing” to reach the smartphones 
of women near reproductive health clinics with anti-abortion messaging). 
 86 Fazlioglu, supra note 80, at 304 (quoting Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 
79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 119 (2004)). 
 87 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 84, at 1816, 1831–32 (citing Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2006)) (defining PII initially as “‘individually identifiable 
information about an individual collected online,’ including first and last name, physical address, social 
security number, telephone number, and e-mail address”); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text 
(stating that HIPAA protects only individually identifiable health information). Current U.S. privacy laws 
often rely on definitions of PII to trigger jurisdiction while betraying the “basic assumption—that in the 
absence of PII, there is no privacy harm.” Schwartz & Solove, supra note 84, at 1816. 
 88 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 84, at 1877. 
 89 Id. at 1878. 
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propose applying a full suite of privacy principles to the data of identified 
persons, such as: 
(1) limits on information use; (2) limits on data collection, also termed data 
minimization; (3) limits on disclosure of personal information; (4) collection 
and use only of information that is accurate, relevant, and up-to-date (data 
quality principle); (5) notice, access, and correction rights for the individual; (6) 
the creation of processing systems that the concerned individual can know about 
and understand (transparent processing systems); and (7) security for personal 
data.90 
For information less likely to be identified, the authors recommend 
scaling down these principles.91 For example, with merely identifiable data, 
it is likely unnecessary to extend full notice, access, and rectification rights.92 
However, principles of security, transparency, and data quality might remain 
important in these situations, and security protocols should be subsequently 
tailored to the nature of the information and the risk of disclosure.93 Other 
contextual factors should influence this determination such as “the lifetime 
for which information is to be stored, the likelihood of future development 
of relevant technology, and parties’ incentives to link identifiable data to a 
specific person.”94 
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD: 
EVALUATING PROPOSED AND UPCOMING SOLUTIONS 
Presently, there are a number of suggested or impending solutions that 
could meet the regulatory needs outlined in the HHS Report.95 This section 
will evaluate three such solutions. First, this section will discuss the industry-
agnostic California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA).96 Second, this 
section will discuss the industry-specific bill that U.S. Senators Amy 
Klobuchar and Lisa Murkowski introduced in 2019, the Protecting Personal 
 
 90 Id. at 1880 (citing Paul M. Schwartz, Preemption and Privacy, 118 YALE L.J. 908 (2009)). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. (“For one thing, if the law created such interests, these obligations would decrease rather than 
increase privacy by requiring that all such data be associated with a specific person.”). 
 93 Id. at 1881. 
 94 Id. at 1878; see also Khaled El Emam, Heuristics for De-Identifying Health Data, IEEE SECURITY 
& PRIVACY, July–Aug. 2008, at 58; Khaled El Emam, Risk-Based De-Identification of Health Data, IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY, May–June 2010, at 64, 66–67 (noting that computer scientists have also devised 
metrics that quantify the risk of re-identification, with one scientist’s work focusing on “mitigating 
controls” available to entities in possession of data and the likely “motives and capacity” of other parties 
who might want to associate that information to an individual). 
 95 See supra Section II. 
 96 California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 et seq. (West 2018) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2020) (extending privacy rights and obligations to California residents and those doing 
business in California, respectively). 
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Health Data Act.97 Finally, this section will conclude with analysis of a 
proposal offered by Professor Charlotte Tschider to expand FDA oversight 
to include all mHealth platforms regardless of their risk to patients because 
“the framework for pre-market disclosures, quality management programs, 
and post-market obligations matches most product development 
lifecycles.”98 
A. CCPA 
The CCPA is the strictest data protection and consumer privacy law in 
the United States and is already impacting the mHealth sector. 99 Businesses 
subject to the CCPA are required to extend to consumers rights of access, 
deletion, disclosure, and the ability to opt-out of information sales.100 While 
the CCPA is a state law jurisdictionally limited to California residents 
(“consumers”) and entities doing business in the state (“businesses”), it 
offers a viable template for analyzing how an industry-agnostic privacy law 
could regulate NCEs if applied on a national scale.101 
1. Impact on NCEs 
Many of the rights and obligations imposed by the CCPA would fill the 
regulatory gaps noted in the HHS Report. First, the CCPA would impose a 
host of disclosure requirements on NCEs by requiring notice at or before the 
point of information collection.102 A compliant notice informs consumers of 
categories of personal information collected and the purposes for which the 
categories will be used.103 Under the CCPA’s notice requirements, NCEs 
must inform consumers whether information has been sold or disclosed to 
third parties while providing an opt-out right if information may be sold.104 
Finally, if the NCE subsequently collects additional categories of personal 
information or has new purposes for collection of the existing information, 
 
 97 Protecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 1842, 116th Cong. (2019) (acting specifically on NCEs 
and the findings of the HHS Report). 
 98 Charlotte A. Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health Marketplace, 26 ANNALS 
HEALTH L. 1, 32 n.185 (2017). 
 99 EHEALTH INITIATIVE FOUND., RISKY BUSINESS? SHARING DATA WITH ENTITIES NOT COVERED 
BY HIPAA 5 (2019), https://www.ehidc.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/Sharing%20Data%20with
%20Non-HIPAA%20Entities%20March%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/AH4S-K4DL] (noting that the 
CCPA also has a carve out exempting CEs and BAs covered by HIPAA). 
 100 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(a)–(d), 1798.105(a), (c), (d), 1798.120, 1798.135(a)(1). 
 101 Id. § 1798.140; see generally Examining Legislative Proposals to Protect Consumer Data 
Privacy: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 116th Cong. (2019) (holding a hearing 
regarding a potential national privacy law incorporating elements of the GDPR and the CCPA). 
 102 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b). 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. §§ 1798.115(c)–(d); 1798.120(b). 
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additional notice must be given.105 Consistent with the HHS Report, the 
CCPA’s robust disclosure requirements would address the relative dearth of 
privacy policies among NCEs, improve existing policies’ content, and 
require additional notice if any changes are made.106 
On the issue of access, the CCPA obligates NCEs to heed a consumer 
request to access their data up to twice in a twelve-month period and must 
ensure its portability in either electronic format or by mail.107 The CCPA also 
addresses information sales to third parties by letting consumers learn details 
about these parties, along with other categorical distinctions about the 
information sold.108 Thus, the CCPA’s access rights and obligations would 
inform consumers about “policies, procedures, and technologies that directly 
affect . . . their individually identifiable health information.”109 
In addition to mandating transparency through disclosure and access, 
the CCPA gives consumers rights to opt-out of information sales and to 
request deletion of their personal information subject to certain exceptions.110 
When heeding a consumer deletion request, the CCPA would obligate an 
NCE to direct any service providers to delete the information as well.111 Also 
under the CCPA, third parties must provide explicit notice and opt-out rights 
if re-selling data to fourth parties.112 Taken together, the CCPA gives 
consumers the ability to check potentially harmful information practices at 
the third- and fourth-party levels as discussed previously in this Note.113 
Finally, the CCPA does not mandate any specific formalized security 
protocols.114 Instead, the law extends a private right of action to consumers 
whose nonencrypted information was obtained through “unauthorized access 
 
 105 Id. 
 106 See discussion supra Sections II.C, II.D. 
 107 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100(a), (d), 1798.110(a)(1)–(4) (Consumers have the right to access 
categories of personal information collected, categories of its sources, purposes for collecting, and certain 
details about information sold/disclosed to third parties.). 
 108 Id. §§ 1798.110(a)(4), 1798.115(a)(2)–(3). 
 109 HHS, EXAMINING OVERSIGHT, supra note 9, at 21 (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO. TECH., NATIONWIDE PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC EXCHANGE OF INDIVIDUALLY IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH 
INFORMATION 7 (2008), https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/nationwide-ps-framework-5.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KT6M-3CGE]). 
 110 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.105(a), (c)–(d). 
 111 Id. § 1798.105(c). 
 112 Id. § 1798.115(d). 
 113 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 114 See Bret Cohen et al., California Consumer Privacy Act: The Challenge Ahead – The CCPA’s 




NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
124 
and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’s violation of 
the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and 
practices appropriate to the nature of the information[.]”115 Although the 
CCPA does not define what constitutes “reasonable” under the 
circumstances, the state Attorney General’s office has endorsed the Center 
for Internet Security’s safeguards to act as a baseline.116 
2. Is the Definition of PII Context-Based? 
The CCPA defines personal information as that which “identifies, 
relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could 
reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or 
household.”117 In addition to listing common identifiers, the law gives 
examples of other novel sources of protected personal information including: 
network activity, search history, biometric data, geolocation data, and any 
“inferences drawn . . . to create a profile about a consumer.”118 This is an 
expansive definition of personal information seemingly cognizant of the fact 
that “every scrap of data could assist reidentification.”119 While broad 
definitions of personal information might proscribe many of the harmful data 
practices of NCEs discussed earlier in this note, they also risk chilling those 
that benefit consumers and society at large, thus betraying insensitivity to 
context.120 Notably, the law’s carve-out for medical research is one such 
confusing circumstance.121 
In sum, while the CCPA targets some of the most invasive big data 
behaviors, imprecision in certain areas hinders the law’s attempts at 
achieving optimal context sensitivity.122 
 
 115 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1). 
 116 Download the CIS Controls® V7.1 Today, CENTER FOR INTERNET SECURITY, 
https://learn.cisecurity.org/cis-controls-download [https://perma.cc/WC5S-BS4M]. 
 117 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1). 
 118 Id. But see id. § 1798.140(o)(2) (excepting publicly available information, i.e., that which is made 
available from federal, state, or local government records). 
 119 Eric Goldman, A Privacy Bomb Is About to Be Dropped on the California Economy and the 
Global Internet, TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (June 27, 2018), https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018
/06/a-privacy-bomb-is-about-to-be-dropped-on-the-california-economy-and-the-global-internet.htm 
[https://perma.cc/7HPJ-3WL7]. 
 120 See supra Section III; e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.140(s), 1798.125(a)(2) (indicating 
potentially beneficial use case where businesses could provide better prices and service because of 
consumer data). 
 121 See Mike Hintze, Science and Privacy: Data Protection Laws and Their Impact on Research, 
14 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 103, 129–31 (2019) (indicating that the CCPA’s implications for data-
driven medical research are uncertain). Negative impacts might be felt if a consumer exercises their opt-
out and deletion rights when data is being used for genuine research purposes. Id. Plus, the law has vexing 
definitions of the terms “sale” and “research,” which the author believes could discourage these beneficial 
use cases. Id. 
 122 Id.; see also Fazlioglu, supra note 80, at 301. 
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B. Protecting Personal Health Data Act, Senate Bill 1842 
In direct response to the findings of the HHS Report, U.S. Senators 
Klobuchar and Murkowski have introduced the Protecting Personal Health 
Data Act, Senate Bill 1842, to address the myriad of privacy issues observed 
among NCEs.123 This legislation would reach direct-to-consumer devices, 
services, applications, and software whose substantial purpose or use is to 
use or collect health data.124 Excluded from the law are “products on which 
personal health data is derived solely from other information that is not 
personal health data, such as Global Positioning System data,” as well as 
those products designed or marketed for CEs and BAs.125 Bill 1842 defines 
personal health data as: 
any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in any 
form or medium, that relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental 
health or condition of an individual and that identifies the individual or with 
respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe that the information can 
be used to identify the individual.126 
Further, Bill 1842 directs the HHS Secretary with the help of other 
“relevant stakeholders” to promulgate regulations, notably those that 
“account for differences in the nature and sensitivity of the data collected or 
stored on the consumer device, service, application, or software.”127 In 
addition, Bill 1842 requests that the Secretary consider uniform standards for 
access, deletion, correction, and consent or its withdrawal for information-
sharing practices.128 Finally, Bill 1842 calls for the creation of a task force to 
evaluate and provide input on the effectiveness of de-identification 
methodologies as well as security, encryption, and transfer protocols.129 If 
passed, Bill 1842 would presumably meet the needs highlighted in the HHS 
Report because it was drafted explicitly to address them.130 Bill 1842 
broadens the applicability of the PHI framework to NCEs, and it invites the 
creation of uniform standards around disclosure, access, third parties, and 
 
 123 Protecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 1842, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 124 Id. § 3. 
 125 Id. § 3(1)(C). 
 126 Id. § 3(5). 
 127 Id. §§ 3(6), 4(b) (including consultation with the “Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, 
the National Coordinator . . . and heads of such other Federal agencies as the Secretary considers 
appropriate . . . ”). 
 128 Id. § 4(b)(2)(A). 
 129 Id. § 5. 
 130 Id. §§ 2, 4. 
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security specifically tailored to NCEs.131 However, there are reasons for 
skepticism. 
First, Bill 1842 invites federal agencies to “account for differences in 
the nature and sensitivity of the data.”132 While Bill 1842 extends HIPAA’s 
PHI definition to NCEs, it also asks for rules that might overlay the concept 
of PHI as it is currently understood. Seemingly, Bill 1842 compels federal 
agencies to commit to a “nature, type, or category” approach to 
understanding data sensitivity rather than to one that focuses on the manner 
of use and any context-sensitive risks to consumers.133 
Second, Bill 1842 exempts “products on which personal health data is 
derived solely from other information that is not personal health data, such 
as Global Positioning System data.”134 This stands in contrast with the 
CCPA, which reaches geolocation data and “[i]nferences” used to create a 
profile of an individual.135 In one troubling example from 2017, an 
advertising company placed “geofencing” around reproductive health 
centers to target women eighteen to twenty-four years-old with anti-abortion 
messages.136 
Mindful of the ability to assemble health data through other 
information, any rulemaking that flows from Bill 1842 ought to consider the 
sliding scale posited in Schwartz and Solove’s PII 2.0 proposal, where 
processors of identified, identifiable, and non-identifiable data face different 
obligations depending on context.137 
C. Expanding FDA Oversight 
In a 2017 article, Professor Charlotte Tschider proposed greater 
involvement of the FDA to meet cybersecurity needs in the mHealth arena.138 
Professor Tschider states that the Agency “has the regulatory structure, 
function, and focus to effectively regulate the digital health marketplace with 
some involvement from OCR, FTC, and ONC partners.”139 To achieve more 
complete oversight, the FDA would need to include mHealth platforms in its 
definition of a medical device, which might coax the industry into 
compliance with Quality System measures and extend natural benefits to the 
 
 131 Id. §§ 3–4. 
 132 Id. § 4. 
 133 Fazlioglu, supra note 80, at 286, 288, 304 (emphasis omitted). 
 134 S. 1842 § 3. 
 135 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(o)(1); cf. Woodward & Bray, supra note 85. 
 136 Woodward & Bray, supra note 85. 
 137 Schwartz & Solove, supra note 84, at 1877. 
 138 Tschider, supra note 98, at 31–32. But see 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (indicating that the FDA chooses 
to not regulate all “devices”). 
 139 Tschider, supra note 98, at 32. 
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consumer.140 In addition, the FDA would need to overhaul pre-market 
requirements by making all manufacturers of Class I and II digital health 
devices (under the new definition) submit a 501(k).141 This would provide 
greater confidence in products due to the extensive disclosure obligations 
attached to 501(k) submissions.142 Within these existing requirements could 
be an additional mandate to disclose cybersecurity risk management 
processes because “Class I devices, like mobile apps, also likely involve 
processing, transfer, and storage of highly sensitive health information, 
making them more likely to be a conduit for healthcare fraud.”143 Finally, the 
FDA can rely on previous experience enforcing Quality System measures to 
ensure steady compliance with cybersecurity standards.144 
Overall, increased FDA involvement is an attractive solution to 
regulating mHealth and NCEs because of the Agency’s existing 
infrastructure, which is conveniently geared towards ensuring consumer 
safety in a variety of contexts. 
CONCLUSION 
As consumers gain the ability to track personal behavior and lifestyle 
in new and meaningful ways, the need to protect this data increases as well. 
Ideally, a national general data privacy law resembling the CCPA would 
provide consumers with a clear set of rights and recourse to check harmful 
or risky data practices.145 However, in the current public health crisis due to 
COVID-19, health data privacy has taken a back seat as even HIPAA 
enforcement has been relaxed to facilitate expansion of telehealth and remote 
patient encounters.146 Global health crisis notwithstanding—more marginal 
 
 140 Id. (“Many benefits to the consumer will naturally extend from FDCA regulatory controls, 
including required inclusion of a quality management system, policy development and standard operating 
procedures, accountability, and employee training. These general controls map well to a standardized 
cybersecurity program.”). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 32–33 (“The FDA could easily incorporate a requirement for organizations to disclose 
details of their cybersecurity risk management programs.”). 
 143 Id. at 33, 35. 
 144 Id. at 35 (citing U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Federal Judge Approves Consent Decree with Maquet 
Holding B.V. & Co, EIN PRESSWIRE (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.einpresswire.com/article/248127168
/federal-judge-approves-consent-decree-with-maquet-holding-b-v-co [https://perma.cc/Y5D5-
8MWW]). 
 145 See, e.g., Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2020, H.R. 6675, 116th Cong. 
(2020) (proposing new national data privacy law with optimal context sensitivity, based on relative 
privacy harms of certain data practices). 
 146 See Notification of Enforcement Discretion for Telehealth Remote Communications During the 
COVID-19 Nationwide Public Health Emergency, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (March 20, 
2020), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/special-topics/emergency-preparedness/notification
-enforcement-discretion-telehealth/index.html [https://perma.cc/VDZ6-QFGM]. 
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and less disruptive enhancements like Bill 1842 or use of the FDA’s existing 
infrastructure might still provide quicker protection for consumers because 
those solutions likely have a greater chance of becoming law.147 
 
 
 147 Protecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 1842, 116th Cong. (2019) (functioning as an 
enhancement/expansion of HIPAA protections, and FDA oversight expansion would simply involve new 
rulemaking and/or guidance). 
